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Abstract 
This paper uses a unique micro-level data-set on Chinese firms to test for the existence of a 
"political-pecking order" in the allocation of credit. Our findings are threefold. Firstly, private 
Chinese firms are credit constrained while State-owned firms and foreign-owned firms in 
China are not; Secondly, the geographical and sectoral presence of foreign capital alleviates 
credit constraints faced by private Chinese firms. Thirdly, geographical and sectoral presence 
of state firms aggravates financial constraints for private Chinese firms (“crowding out”). 
Therefore it seems that ongoing restructuring of the state-owned sector and further 
liberalization of foreign capital inflows in China can help to circumvent financial constraints 
and can boost the investment of private firms. 
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1. Introduction 
There is considerable evidence that financial constraints are an impediment to 
investment and growth of firms (Stein, 2003; Hubbard, 1998). This is even more 
important in developing countries, where the access to financial markets is a crucial 
determinant for the growth and survival of firms. Financial constraints can arise from 
various kinds of sources. The literature identifies informational asymmetries and 
agency problems as the most important factors influencing the allocation process of 
financial resources to firms.4  
Capital market imperfections are believed to be very present in China. By law, the 
largest Chinese banks, which were predominantly state banks, were until 1998 
instructed not to lend to private firms. This was embedded in a deep political notion 
that private firms do not rank high in terms of political status. This “political pecking 
order” in the allocation of credit where private Chinese firms are discriminated 
against compared to state-owned firms should in principle have been alleviated since 
1998. But casual evidence suggests that credit constraints for private firms still exist 
because they are rooted in deep social and political factors (Huang, 2003).  
Several macro studies have emphasized the detrimental effect of local government 
interference in capital allocation in China5, with only a few studies at the micro-level.6 
The macro-level studies analyze the links between finance and growth in China and 
characterize it as a counterexample to the positive relationship generally found 
between finance and growth in the literature. Indeed, in spite of a malfunctioning 
financial system, China has one of the fastest growing economies.  
The analysis in this paper is a micro-level study that extends the literature in several 
dimensions. First, it offers an explanation for the conundrum of firm growth in China 
despite evidence of credit constraints. We look at the presence of foreign capital and 
how it can mitigate the financial discrimination experienced by Chinese private firms. 
Our evidence suggests that foreign firms in China do not face credit constraints 
indicating that they have superior legal status compared to private firms (Naughton, 
2007). Alternatively they may be less dependent on the local financial system in 
China since they can rely on other sources to finance their growth. Either they can 
                                                 
4 See Stein (2003) and Hubbard (1998) for a review. 
5 Allen (2005), Levin (2005), Guariglia and Poncet (2008). 
6 Héricourt and Poncet (2008), Guariglia, Liu and Song (2008). 
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continue to have access to capital markets abroad or rely on intra-firm financial 
transfers. Our results also suggest that the stronger the presence of foreign capital in a 
sector or region, the lower the financial constraints faced by Chinese private firms 
operating in the same region and sector. This suggests that the presence of foreign 
capital somehow allows Chinese private firms to bypass both the financial and legal 
obstacles that they face at home. Our results for China differ from earlier findings in 
the literature. For instance Harrison and McMillan (2003) for the Ivory Coast find that 
the presence of foreign firms crowds local firms out of domestic capital markets. Our 
results suggest otherwise for China. 
    Second, we also assess the extent to which the effectiveness of financial constraints 
on private firms’ activity is contingent on state firms’ presence in the local economy. 
Our results show that state presence aggravates credit constraints faced by domestic 
Chinese firms which points at a "crowding-out" effect where stronger presence of 
state firms makes it more difficult for private firms to access capital. 
    From a methodological point of view we follow Harrison et al. (2004). We 
introduce external financing costs in the investment Euler equation to evaluate the 
magnitude of financial constraints in China. Sensitivity of investment to cash flow is 
associated with financial constraints. In perfect capital markets and in the absence of 
credit constraints, cash flow should not affect future investment. If results show 
otherwise this can be interpreted as an indication that capital markets are not perfect 
and that credit constraints exist. 
    Our work is related to the existing literature on capital market imperfections and 
firm investment in transition and developing economies (see Konings et al. (2003), 
Lizal and Svejnar (2002) and Harrison and McMillan (2003)). 
    In the first part of the paper, we test the “political pecking order” by analyzing 
whether different types of firm ownership face a different degree of financial 
constraints. In the second part, we investigate how Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
and the presence of state firms interact with the credit constraints that exist for 
Chinese private firms. More precisely we test whether the geographical and sectoral 
presence of foreign investment in China play an important role in modulating private 
firms’ credit constraints and similarly for the geographical and sectoral presence of 
state-owned firms.  
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Our analysis is carried out on Chinese firm-level data originating from the data set 
ORIANA7 covering more than 20,000 Chinese firms over the period 1999-2005. Our 
findings confirm the “pecking order” hypothesis put forward by Huang (2003), where 
private firms face the highest degree of financial constraints, whereas State Owned 
enterprises (SOE) and foreign firms do not experience any financial constraints. We 
find that the sensitivity of private firms' investment to cash flow softens in a context 
of abundant foreign investment. By contrast, credit constraints are reinforced when 
the presence of state-owned firms is strong. These results show that the ongoing 
restructuring of SOE may help to circumvent credit constraints and can boost the 
investment and growth of private firms. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical 
justification for our measure of financing constraints. Section 3 describes the data. 
Section 4 presents estimation results of the baseline model which tests whether firms 
face different credit constraints depending on their capital ownership (private, foreign 
or State-owned status). Section 5 allows for provincial and industry heterogeneity and 
tests whether direct foreign investment and state presence affects the credit constraints 
faced by private firms. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Theoretical background 
We estimate a version of the Euler equation, combining insights from Whited (1992), 
Bond and Meghir (1994) and Love (2003) to test for the political pecking order in 
China. The main advantage of the model is that under the maintained structure, the 
model captures the influence of current expectations of future profitability on current 
investment decisions. This simple model allows us to formalize the political pecking 
order hypothesis and consistently estimate financial constraints for different types of 
firms. The Euler equation characterizes a firm’s optimal investment path and relates it 
to marginal adjustment costs in adjacent periods. A credit constrained firm behaves as 
if it has a higher discount rate for a given level of today’s adjustment costs. Ceteris 
paribus, constrained firms will then substitute investment tomorrow for investment 
today. We closely follow Harrison et al. (2004) and define the value of the firm as tV :  
                                                 
7 This database contains detailed financial information on contact information, activities, ownership 
and financing.  
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Where the value of a firm in (1) is defined as the discounted stream of future 
dividends paid out to shareholders; 1t sβ + −  is the discount factor from the period t+s to 
period t and tD  is the dividend. Equation (2) shows that the dividend that is paid out 
to shareholders in each period equals profits ( )t tK ξΠ , minus the adjustment cost of 
new investment ( )t tC K I,  minus investment expenditure tI . The costs of adjusting 
the stock of capital ( )t tC K I,  correspond to disruption costs, costly learning, delivery 
lags and time to install any new or replacement capital. It is assumed to result in a loss 
of a portion of the investment. Additionally to the model of Harrison et al. (2004), we 
also subtract the costs of employees, twL  in (2). By subtracting the cost of employees, 
the adjustment cost of investment ( )t tC K I,  is net of labor costs. In the capital 
accumulation constraint (Eq. 3), tK  is the capital stock at the beginning of the period, 
tI  is the investment expenditure and δ  is the depreciation rate. The restricted profit 
function is denoted by ( )t tK ξΠ , , where tξ  is a productivity shock specific for each 
firm. Credit constraints are modeled as a non-negative dividend constraint (Eq. 4). Let 
the multiplier on this constraint be denoted by λ . This multiplier is interpreted as a 
shadow cost associated with raising new equity, which implies that external (equity) 
financing is costly.  
Following Harrison et al. (2004), we obtain the Q-model of investment as a first order 
condition from the above model and after combining it with the envelope condition 
and rearranging it we get the Euler equation:  
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Here, 1
1
t
tK
+
+
∂Π
∂  is the marginal profit of capital, i.e. the contribution of an extra unit of 
capital to the firm’s profits. In the Euler equation the factor i t,Ω  is the relative shadow 
cost of external finance in periods t and t+1 and serves as a proxy for the degree of 
financing constraints. If 1 0t tλ λ+ = =  then i t,Ω =1, we are in a perfect capital market 
and the external costs of financing is 18. If the shadow cost of external funds is higher 
in period t  than in period 1t + , so 1Ω < , then current funds are relatively more 
expensive today than tomorrow. In this case we say that the firm is financial 
constrained. If the shadow cost ( 1Ω > ) then current funds are less expensive than 
tomorrow and the firm will invest today.9 Firms do not face financial constraints if the 
shadow cost of investment 1 0t tλ λ+ = =  for all time periods.  
Common to the literature is that financial constraints are measured by the sensitivity 
of investment with respect to internally generated funds. The sensitivity of investment 
to internal generated funds such as cash flow, is a well reported fact in the literature 
(Fazzari et al., 1988; Carpenter and Peterson, 2002). We assume that firms make their 
decision for period t  investment at the beginning of the year. Therefore the decisive 
value of cash flow is in period 1t −  since the firm gauges its previous cash flow to 
determine the current investment decision.  
In this paper we focus on institutional imperfections in Chinese credit markets, i.e. the 
political pecking order that leads to a gap between the costs of internal versus external 
financing. According to the political pecking order in China, firms are discriminated 
against in their access to credit based on their ownership. To test for different 
                                                 
8 Another possibility would be if 1 0t tλ λ+ = ≠ , then current firms are constrained by the same factor in period 
t  and 1t + . Since the shadow cost depends also on the productivity shock tξ  it is unlikely that 1t tλ λ+ =  in all 
periods, although for some firms in some periods this is possible. Still we argue as in Love (2003) that in 
estimating ownership-wide constraints given firm specific investment opportunities such a situation is unlikely to 
occur. 
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ownership effects, we split our sample between private, state-owned and foreign 
companies.  
To derive the estimation equation, we assume a constant returns to scale production 
function with quadratic adjustment costs of investment. Similar to the previous 
literature, Harrison et al. (2004) and Love (2003), we include the lagged investment to 
capital ratio ( 1
1
it
i t
I
K
−
, −
) in the cost function to allow for correlation between the 
previous and actual investment decision. We expect the labor to capital ratio ( L K/ ) to 
proxy for the marginal product of profits with respect to capital as it is conceivable 
that higher investment leads to a higher capital to labor ratio. Moreover, if we assume 
rational expectations, we can replace the future realizations of the variables with the 
real terms together with a measurement error i tε , . Firm-specific investment 
oppportunies are approximated by the change in turnover over capital ( it
i t
TU
K ,
Δ ). Our 
main variable of interest is the cash-flow ratio ( 1
1
it
i t
CF
K
−
, −
) whose sign and 
significance is our measure of credit constraints. Given our assumptions, the empirical 
equation that we seek to estimate has the following standard specification:  
1 1
1 2 3 4
1 1
it it it it it
k t i t
i t i t i t i t i t
I I L TU CF
K K K K K
β β β β λ ε− − , ,
, , − , , , −
Δ= + + + + +                     (7) 
 
In the above equation, I  denotes gross investment in fixed assets,10 L  is the number 
of employees, K is the level of the real capital stock (proxied by total assets), ΔTU 
corresponds to the change in turnover and CF stands for cash flow. The subscripts i , 
k  and t  denote the firm, industry and time period, respectively; and k tλ ,  captures the 
sector-time specific effects, i tε ,  is the error term. We expect that in (7) actual 
investment is negatively related to past investment and to the employment over assets 
ratio. We further expect current investment to be positively related to favorable 
prospects captured by the current change in turnover over assets ratio. As we 
                                                                                                                                            
No previous mentioning of r  
10 It is defined as the change in the tangible fixed assets of firm i  between time t  and time ( 1)t −  
plus the firm specific depreciation rate of capital. Almeida and Campello (2006) argue that excluding 
intangible assets (patents, copyrights, trademarks, etc) from the definition of investment reduces 
measurement errors of investment. 
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discussed above, we measure financing constraints by the sensitivity of investment to 
cash flow. We argue that the larger this sensitivity, the more constrained the firm is 
since it has to rely on its internal funds to finance its investment. In order to validate 
our hypothesis of the political pecking order, we would expect an insignificant 
coefficient on the cash flow indicator ( 4β ) when the sample is restricted to state-
owned or to foreign firms, but a positive and significant coefficient when private 
firms are considered since they rank lowest in the political pecking order. To study 
the contingency of credit constraints for Chinese private firms we include variables 
measuring the presence of foreign investment and state-firms by province and by 
province/sector and interact those with our proxies for credit constraints.  
We anticipate the sensitivity of investment to cash flow to be lower for private firms 
located in provinces/sectors where FDI is abundant. An opposite result would in 
contrast point to a crowding-out effect. As far as the effect of state corporate presence 
is concerned, we expect that the higher the presence of the state-owned corporate 
sector, the more crowding-out there will be and the stronger the credit constraints for 
private firms will be.  
3. Data 
3.1. Firm-level data 
The data that we use are firm-level data originating from the Oriana data set.11 This 
database contains detailed financial information on contact information, activities, and 
ownership of more than 20,000 Chinese firms in the time period of 1998 to 2005. Our 
data was collected by local governments based on the Accounting Standards for 
Business Enterprises (ASBE) system promulgated by the Ministry of Finance in 1992. 
We distinguish among different types of legal ownership: State and collective Owned 
Enterprises, Foreign Invested Enterprises, and private Chinese companies. A firm is 
classified by Oriana as a State Owned Enterprize (SOE) if the ownership share of the 
state (no matter whether direct or indirect) is more than 25 percent.12 In our empirical 
estimations we pool SOE with urban and rural collectively owned enterprizes (COE), 
and include also township and village enterprizes (TVEs). The collective-owned 
                                                 
11 Oriana dataset is made available by Bureau van Dijk. It is constructed from Huaxia credit. 
12 See Huygebaert et al. (2006). 
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enterprize is an independent economic organization and legal corporation with means 
of production and property belonging to laboring masses and managed by local 
government. COEs are thus ranked quite high in the political pecking order and are 
expected to receive preferential treatment over private firms in the access to credit.  
Private firms in our sample refer to profit-making economic organizations, which can 
either be sole proprietorships, partnerships, limited liability companies, or 
shareholding cooperatives.13 Foreign firms or Foreign Invested Enterprises refer to 
any enterprise domiciled in mainland China that has at least 25 percent of the total 
equity stake of the firm owned by a foreign entity.  
The construction of the sample used in our regressions is essentially driven by the 
dynamic nature of our model (Eq. 7). Our sample is restricted to companies that report 
at least two consecutive years. Furthermore, we delete the upper and the lower one 
percentile of the distribution of the dependent variable to get rid off outliers. Table 1 
reports the summary statistics of the firms used in our empirical work according to 
their ownership structure. The values in column (1) represent the statistical means 
together with the standard errors in (2), minimum (3) and maximum values (4) over 
the sample period. In terms of ownership representation, 38% of the total firms are 
private firms, while 35% are foreign firms. State owned firms and collective firms 
represent 27% of our sample.  
 
Insert Table 1 here 
 
    Overall, the summary statistics in Table 1 are already indicative of the political 
pecking order in China Despite the fact that private firms also appear the most 
efficient in investing their capital. 
 
4. Investment Equation Estimates 
Results for our baseline specification in (7) are reported in Table 2. They are shown 
for different types of ownership i.e. domestic private firms (col.1, 4 and 7), public 
SOE firms (col. 2, 5 and 8) and foreign firms (col. 3, 6 and 9). All regressions include 
time dummies defined at the two-digit sector level to control for all shifts in 
                                                 
13 Another form of individual businesses, known as Getihu, are not included in the data set since they are by law 
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investment demand or expectations due to changes in industry-level conditions (for 
example, industry-wide technology changes, industry demand shocks, or the entry of 
new firms). Our main variable of interest is the coefficient on the cash-flow. When 
investment significantly depends on a firm’s internally generated cash flow this can 
be regarded as an indication that the firm is credit constrained. We estimate 
successively our model with OLS, IV and finally firm-fixed effects to check the 
robustness of our results. We start by reporting OLS results in columns 1 to 3. The 
focus of our attention goes to the sign and magnitude of the coefficient on the lagged 
cashflow which is our measures of credit constraints. As conjectured, we find that 
private firms in China significantly rely on their cash flow to finance their 
investments which is evidence of credit constaints, while SOEs and foreign firms do 
not. The results are robust to the inclusion of sector-time effects or time effects only. 
However, the OLS estimates may be biased due to the endogeneity of the cash flow, 
our proxy for internal finance. In columns 4 to 6 we apply an IV technique to address 
this where we use the cash flow over assets in periods t-2 and t-3 as instruments.14 
The results go through be it with a weaker significance of the positive coefficient on 
the private firms, suggesting that the endogeneity of the cash flow is not too serious 
an issue. We systematically check the validity of our instruments with Sargan’s J-test 
of overidentifying restrictions. Insignificant test statistics indicate that the 
orthogonality of the instruments and the error terms cannot be rejected, and thus that 
our choice of instruments is appropriate.15 In the case of private firms (column 4), the 
overidentifying restrictions are accepted. By constrast the Sargan test rejects the 
validity of our instruments for state and foreign firms, a problem encountered also in 
previous work emphasizing the weakness of IV instruments in this kind of estimations 
(Aghion et al. 2008). We also report the cluster-robust F-stat form of the Cragg-
Donald statistic; this statistic has been suggested by Stock and Yogo (2002) as a 
global test for the presence of weak instruments (i.e., it tests the null hypothesis that a 
given group of instruments is weak against the alternative that it is strong). The test 
rejects if the computed statistic exceeds the critical value. Results of weak 
                                                                                                                                            
not allowed to have more than eight employees and are thus too small to be included. 
14 Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) in addition to the cash-flow also instrument several other 
independent variables using a GMM approach. However, due to the short time dimension of our panel 
we can not pursue the same approach.  
15 Under the joint null hypothesis that instruments are valid instruments and that the excluded 
instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation, the test statistic is distributed as 2χ  in 
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identification tests are overall quite satisfactory. Our instruments pass comfortably the 
Cragg-Donald test in all cases since our first stage F-statistics are consistently above 
10, verifying the Staiger-Stock (1997) “rule of thumb”.  
Another drawback of the OLS results presented in the first three columns of Table 2 is 
that firm-level factors such as the user cost of capital are omitted. In columns 7 to 9, 
we include firm fixed effects to control for all unobserved time-invariant variables as 
in the related work of Bond and Meghir (1994) and Harrison and McMillan (2003). It 
also controls for the possibility of a correlation between a time-invariant component 
of the error and the regressors which would make the pooled OLS estimation 
inconsisten16.t. In addition we also include a squared cash-flow term to allow for non-
linearities in credit constraints. The results with the firm-fixed effects in the last three 
columns of Table 2 show that the coefficient on cash-flow again is positive (and 
highly significant) for private firms. The negative and significant sign on the squared 
term suggests that a higher cash flow moderates the extent of the credit constraint for 
private Chinese firms. Conversely, public companies’ and foreign companies’ 
investments are not positively affected by cash-flow. The specification in column 7 
for Chinese private firms suggests that holding other factors constant, a 10% increase 
in the cashflow ratio CF K/  of private firms raises investment by about 0.7%. Using a 
standardized impact approach, we can compute that a one standard deviation increase 
over the mean in the cashflow ratio CF K/  of private firms (1.52=0.105/0.069, cf. 
Table 1) raises investment by 10.5%. Since the average investment rate over our 
sample is 15%, this would mean an additional 1.5 percentage point increase which is 
economically significant.  
 
Insert Table 2 here  
 
In Table 3 we turn to an alternative measure of internal finance as an additional 
robustness check. Following Whited (1992) and Harrison and McMillan (2003), we 
use the ratio of total liabilities over total assets which reflects the indebtedness of a 
firm. This ratio can be interpreted as both a measure of the firm’s lack of collateral 
                                                                                                                                            
the number of other identifying restrictions. Significance is judged at the 10% level. 
16 The inclusion of firm-level fixed effects together with a lagged dependent variable can render the 
coefficients biased and inconsistent. Nickell (1981) shows that the bias approaches 0 as the sample size 
tends to infinity. The within-groups estimator is thus likely to perform well when the time dimension of 
the panel is large which is the case here. 
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and a measure of the firm’s current demand for borrowing relative to its capacity to 
borrow. Similar to Harrison and McMillan (2003) and Héricourt and Poncet (2008) 
we anticipate that credit constrained firms display a negative sensitivity of investment 
to debt burdens.  
As expected, we find the coefficient on total liabilities to assets to be negative (and 
highly significant) only for private companies, meaning that high existing liabilities 
reduces the firm’s capacity to invest. This confirms our earlier results in Table 2 i.e. 
that private Chinese firms are credit constrained. The results on the indebtedness of 
private firms contrast strongly with those on other type of firms where the debt ratio 
does not affect the public companies’ and foreign companies’ investment. For the 
SOE firms in China we interpret this as evidence in support of the notion of a soft 
budget constraints (Qian and Roland, 1998) where irrespective of their indebtedness, 
state-owned firms still find the financial means outside the firm to engage in 
investment. For foreign firms, the irrelevance of firm-level indebtedness for 
investment purposes may be related to intra-group financial means at their disposal. 
 
Insert Table 3 here  
 
Since findings of significant discrimination of private firms by financial institutions 
(but not of state-owned firms) are at odds with the observation that these firms are the 
engine role of growth in the Chinese economy, we move on to investigate whether 
there are some circumstances (related to FDI and state presence) that may modulate 
the effectiveness of the credit restrictions of private Chinese firms.  
 
5. Contingency of the relationship between investment and cash flow 
  At the beginning of the 1980s, the Chinese government decided to gradually 
liberalize its regime for inward FDI by creating several “special economic zones” 
(SEZ) to attract foreign investment.17 In these zones foreign investment was 
encouraged through lower tax rates, fewer and simplified administrative and customs 
procedures and, most importantly, duty free import of components and suppliers 
(Naughton, 2007). Based on this we would expect private firms to face significantly 
                                                 
17 SEZs are entitled to set their own policies and allowed to have a more liberal economic law than the country’s 
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lower financing constraints in provinces that have a greater intensity of foreign direct 
investment. On the contrary, firms located in provinces where the FDI rates are low 
(like the northern and western provinces) are expected to have a higher sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow. To see whether FDI alleviates financial constraints, we use 
the basic specification of equation (7) and include variables measuring the importance 
of foreign investment, both as a main effect and interacted with our proxy for credit 
constraints. Similarly, it can be argued that state-presence in a province may have the 
opposite effect and may aggravate credit constraints for private Chinese firms caused 
amongst others by banks preference to lend to state-owned enterprises.  
  To evaluate whether foreign investment in China and state presence affect the 
magnitude of credit constraints, we will use three types of measures.18 A first set of 
indicators are traditional province-level indicators of the abundance of foreign capital 
and of the relative size of the state corporate sector: the ratio of FDI over GDP and the 
ratio of employment in state-owned firms over total employment respectively. Both 
indicators are taken from the China Statistical Yearbooks. A second set of measures 
rely on information of the fixed asset investment by source of financing. Typically the 
source of financing is broken down into domestic loans, state budgetary 
appropriation, foreign investment, and self-raised funds.19 We will use the “share of 
fixed assets investment financed by foreign sources” as a proxy of foreign capital and 
the “share of fixed assets investment financed by the state budget” as a proxy for state 
presence.  
A third set of indicators relies on Oriana data to measure the importance of the foreign 
and state sector. We use four alternative size measures by looking at tangible assets, 
total assets, turnover and sales held by foreign firms versus state firms respectively at 
the province p  and sector (2-digit) k  level as follows: 
  
                                                                                                                                            
one. 
18 Ideally we would need to have detailed information on ownership changes over time. However, the data 
limitation that we face is that we have information on ownership structure but only for the first year a firm enters 
the dataset. 
19 Domestic loans include funds borrowed from domestic banks and non-bank financial institutions by local 
enterprises and institutions. State budgetary appropriation consists essentially of appropriation in the government 
budget earmarked for capital construction and infrastructure projects. Foreign investment refers to foreign funds in 
fixed assets, foreign funds borrowed and managed by the government or by individual units, as well as foreign 
funds in joint-ventures. Self-raised funds include funds raised by various types of enterprises through non-state 
channels such as bonds, stocks, venture capital, and retained earnings. This data come from the China Statistical 
Yearbooks. 
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X Foreign_Firm
FDI
X
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,
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where Foreign_Firm  is a dummy that equals 1 when the firm is foreign and X  
denotes the alternative variables: tangible assets, total assets, turnover or sales.  
Symmetrically, we measure the importance of state owned corporate sector at the 
province p  and sector (2-digit) k  level as:  
 
i pk t i pk ti
pk t
i pk ti
X State_Firm
State
X
, , , ,
,
, ,
∗= ∑ ∑   (9) 
 
where State_Firm  is a dummy that equals 1 when the firm is state-owned and X  
denotes the alternative variables: tangible assets, total assets, turnover or sales.  
After defining the measures above, our purpose is to analyze their interactions with 
the cashflow variable in our baseline specification in (7). Since our proxies of foreign 
investment and state-presence are introduced in a our preferred specification including 
firm-level fixed effects, their conditioning impact on credit constraints will be 
identified through the time dimension of the data. We believe that our estimates are 
unlikely to suffer from reverse causality as our indicators of foreign investment and 
state importance are computed at the province p  and sector (2-digit) k  level while 
the explained variable is firm specific. It is indeed unlikely that a firm shock translates 
into a change in province-industry level foreign or state presence.20 
 
Table 4 reports results on all the separate indicators that proxy for the abundance of 
foreign capital at the provincial and province/sector level. While column 1 reproduces 
the baseline model for private firms, columns 2 to 7 introduce successively various 
indicators of province-level foreign capital (share of fixed assets investment financed 
by foreign sources; ratio of FDI over GDP; share of foreign enterprises in tangible 
assets; in total assets; in turnover and in sales). Our wide selection of indicators 
allows us to account for different aspects of the foreign presence and to test the 
                                                 
20 When the dependent variable is at the finest level possible, shocks in the error term will be less likely to affect 
the right-hand side variables. Moreover, if the explanatory variables are more aggregated, endogeneity is again less 
likely since shocks to individual variables affect regional variables only slightly. 
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robustness of our results.  
 
Insert Table 4 here  
 
Almost all specifications in Table 4 suggest that FDI eases Chinese private firms’ 
credit constraints, as compared to estimates from the specification including only 
CF K/ , reproduced in column 1. The coefficients on the interaction terms, CF K/  
times our proxies for foreign capital, which are almost all negative and significant for 
private firms, suggest that the presence of foreign firms reduces credit constraints. 
Hence, there is no evidence of crowding-out. Those findings are in line with those of 
Harrison et al. (2004) from a cross-country firm-level panel which showed that 
foreign FDI flows are associated with a reduction in firm-level financing constraints. 
However they contrast with the results in Harrison and McMillan (2003) on Ivory 
Coast data, where the presence of foreign firms crowds local firms out of domestic 
capital markets. These diverging results highlight differences in financial sector 
organization and practice: the scope of crowding out is much more limited in China 
because of the lack of incentives of most banks to lend to non state-owned companies.  
Our results thus overall indicate that abundance of foreign capital constitutes a 
circumstance under which financial distortions may not represent an impediment to 
private economic activity.  
 
In addition we look at the presence of the state-owned corporate firms which may also 
be a conditioning factor of the effectiveness of private firms’ credit constraints in 
China.  According to Huang (2003), there exists anecdotal evidence that the degree of 
the political pecking order differs among locations/industries. For example, the 
political pecking order in the Garment industry, one of the few industries private 
entrepreneurs can enter relatively freely, is argued to be characterized by a high 
degree of discrimination of private firms compared to State owned firms. In 
particular, firms high on the political pecking order (State Owned Enterprises) have 
an advantageous access to credit compared to the lower-tiered firms. Moreover, if a 
firm competes directly with a State owned firm in the same industry the chances to 
get a loan diminish substantially. If the conjecture by Huang (2003) is correct, then 
one should see that it is more difficult for private firms, lowered-tiered on the political 
pecking order, to have access to credit, in provinces/sectors where the relative size of 
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the State-owned corporate sector is high. We thus expect that private firms have a 
higher sensitivity of investment to cash flow i.e. are more financially constrained, in 
locations/industries where the state presence is high.  
Table 5 confirms that the effect of the political pecking order of firms on external 
finance costs of private firms is conditional on the relative size of the state-owned 
corporate sector. In columns 2 through 7, a variable measuring the importance of state 
presence is included in the baseline specification (in column (1)), both as a main 
effect and interacted with our proxy for credit constraints. We use each of the 6 
indicators presented earlier to proxy for the size of the state sector at the provincial 
and province/sector level. In columns 2 and 3, we use indicators built at the province 
level with data taken from the China statistical yearbook measuring the “province-
level share of employment in state units” and the “share of investment financed by 
state budget over total investment”. In columns 4 to 7, we rely on proxies computed 
from the Oriana dataset of the “state share in tangible assets, total assets, turnover and 
sales” by province & sector.  
 
Insert Table 5 here  
 
Table 5 shows that in most cases (especially using proxies based on the Oriana 
dataset), the interaction is positive and significant suggesting that a greater size of the 
state-owned corporate sector amplifies credit constraints for private firms. The results 
confirm our prediction that the impact of the political pecking order is more severe in 
industries with a high share of state owned enterprizes. This micro-level evidence is 
coherent with macro-level findings of Guariglia and Poncet (2008) and Boyreau 
Debray and Wei (2005).  
These results suggest that privatization and the further reduction of the state-owned 
corporate sector in China is likely to boost the investment and growth of private firms.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper investigates both the magnitude and the conditioning factors of the 
“political pecking order” of credit allocation to Chinese firms. To identify credit 
constraints we follow the investment literature pioneered by Fazzari et al. (1988) by 
examining the extent to which Chinese firms’ investment is affected by the 
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availability of internal finance.  
The results suggest that private Chinese firms face severe financial constraints while 
we find no such constraints for state-owned and foreign enterprises. Our findings thus 
confirm the hypothesis of Huang (2003) that the Chinese capital market is 
characterized by political pecking order based on firms’ ownership type. This finding 
of discrimination against private firms by financial institutions is at odds with the 
observation that these firms are the engine role of growth in the Chinese economy. 
Theferefore, we aimed to shed further light on the circumstances under which 
financial distortions may not represent an impediment to economic activity. We test 
two conditioning factors of the effectiveness of the discrimination of private firms by 
financial institutions: (1) the role of FDI in funding the Chinese corporate sector and 
(2) the size of the state-owned corporate sector. We identify that FDI is one 
mechanism that helps firms to overcome financial constraints. FDI brings in scarce 
capital, eases financing constraints and spurs growth and investment of private firms. 
The size of the state-owned corporate sector also appears to affect the extent to which 
private firms investment depends on internal finance. Financing constraints are found 
to be increasing with the relative size of the state sector. Indeed, firms competing 
directly with numerous state-owned enterprises in the same province/industry depend 
more strongly on their internal generated funds for their investment.  
  
Overall, our results support the conjecture of Boyreau-Debray and Wei (2005) that the 
state-owned banking sector favors inefficient State Owned firms at the expense of 
private owned firms, which face financial constraints that hinder them to grow. 
Moreover, our results indicate that private firms located in a location/sector where 
foreign capital is abundant and where the state sector is low are more in a position to 
overcome the financial market inefficiencies caused by Chinese economic institutions 
and policies. Our findings allow us to predict the likely impact of the ongoing reforms 
inducing further liberalization and state firms restructuring on the economic 
dynamism of the Chinese economy. We interpret our findings as evidence that credit 
constraints for private firms are likely to be mitigated by the growing importance of 
foreign firms in the Chinese economy as well as the ongoing decline of the state 
economic predominance.  
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 Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
(1) Private firms in our sample refer to 100 percent domestically owned profit-making economic 
organizations in accordance with the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China. The legal form 
of private Chinese firms can be private Limited Liabilities, Private Partnership, Private Share Holding 
or Private Sole Investment. 
(2) State Owned Enterprises (SOE) refers to 100 percent domestically owned firms where the state (no 
matter whether direct or indirect) has at least 25 percent of ownership stake. These arrangements can be 
either be fully State-owned or Jointly State-owned with another party. 
(3) Collective Owned Enterprises (COE) refers to 100 percent domestically owned corporation where 
the means of production and property belonging to labouring masses and are managed by local 
governments. 
(4) Foreign Invested Enterprise (FIE) groups firms with more than 25 percent of registered capital by a 
foreign party.  
 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
 
Mean 
(1) 
Standard 
deviation 
(2) 
Minimum 
(3) 
Maximum
(4) 
Private firms (1):5669 
Investment over Capital 0.086 0.150 -0.487 1.605 
Lagged investment over Capital 0.103 0.162 -0.483 1.600 
Change in turnover over capital 0.290 1.061 -32.699 21.975 
Cash flow over capital 0.069 0.105 -1.460 2.503 
Employment over capital 0.006 0.013 0.000 0.454 
Total employment  1829 3534 5 88547 
Total assets 1273416 3746566 873 145000000
State Owned Enterprises (2): 2357 
Investment over Capital 0.075 0.144 -0.442 1.159 
Lagged investment over Capital 0.080 0.134 -0.442 1.217 
Change in turnover over capital 0.158 0.411 -5.784 6.767 
Cash flow over capital 0.051 0.076 -0.357 0.938 
Employment over capital 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.082 
Total employment  4623 21989 1 439220 
Total assets 3461728 27800000 5571 778000000
Collective Owned Enterprises (3): 1640 
Investment over Capital 0.076 0.151 -0.540 1.679 
Lagged investment over Capital 0.091 0.157 -0.369 1.388 
Change in turnover over capital 0.395 1.285 -13.295 23.060 
Cash flow over capital 0.106 0.188 -1.435 4.602 
Employment over capital 0.008 0.020 0.000 0.379 
Total employment  1624 3918 6 99147 
Total assets 749479 2203650 2396 42400000 
Foreign Invested Enterprises (4): 5301 
Investment over Capital 0.063 0.142 -0.834 1.642 
Lagged investment over Capital 0.076 0.147 -0.670 1.624 
Change in turnover over capital 0.264 0.952 -18.584 19.566 
Cash flow over capital 0.109 0.175 -1.385 8.458 
Employment over capital 0.009 0.020 0.000 0.441 
Total employment  1367 3455 10 140000 
Total assets 699955 2075153 1102 38900000 
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Table 2: OLS, IV technique and Firm-fixed effects to test for credit constraints across ownership types  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Dependent variable: 
Investment over lagged total 
assets Private SOE Foreign Private SOE Foreign Private SOE Foreign 
 OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV FE FE FE 
Lag dependent (investment 
divided  0.095*** -0.009*** 0.100*** 0.125*** -0.048 0.114*** -0.365*** -0.623*** -0.528*** 
by lagged total assets) i, t-1 (0.014) (0.002) (0.019) (0.025) (0.039) (0.020) (0.016) (0.024) (0.018) 
 
Change in turnover over 
assets i, t 0.021*** 0.108** 0.012*** 0.027*** 0.070*** 0.013*** 0.038*** 0.062*** 0.010*** 
 (0.004) (0.047) (0.003) (0.007) (0.025) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
 
Employment over assets i, t -0.357 -1.489** -0.247*** -3.219*** -7.320** -0.598 -6.906*** -14.646*** -5.827*** 
 (0.251) (0.617) (0.094) (1.002) (3.342) (0.543) (1.423) (2.793) (1.779) 
 
Cash flow over assets i, t-1 0.121*** -0.088 0.028 0.109* 0.076 0.013 0.134*** 0.090 -0.019 
 (0.037) (0.159) (0.023) (0.058) (0.203) (0.019) (0.033) (0.087) (0.033) 
Cash flow squared over 
assets i, t-1       
-0.149*** 
(0.025) 
-0.062*** 
(0.018) 
0.016** 
(0.007) 
Sector-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Firm fixed effects no no no no no no yes yes yes 
Observations number  9229 5766 7316 4152 1607 1994 9229 5766 7316 
R-squared 0.074 0.191 0.026 0.110 0.124 0.027 0.195 0.386 0.314 
Cragg-Donald F statistic 
(weak identification test):      727 210 1605    
Sargan statistic 
(overidentification test of all 
instruments): 
Chi-sq(1) P-val    
0.084 
(0.776) 
5.956** 
(0.0147) 
3.077* 
(0.0794)    
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
In columns 4 to 6, Cash flow over assets i, t-1 is instrumented with Cash flow over assets i, t-2 and Cash flow over assets i, t-3. 
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Table 3: Robustness check: alternative proxy for credit constrains across ownership types  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 FE FE FE FE FE FE 
Dependent variable: Investment over 
lagged total assets Private SOE Foreign Private SOE Foreign 
Lag dependent (investment divided  -0.370*** -0.630*** -0.545*** -0.366*** -0.624*** -0.530*** 
by lagged total assets) i, t-1 (0.015) (0.027) (0.017) (0.016) (0.024) (0.018) 
 
Change in turnover over assets i, t 0.033*** 0.051*** 0.012*** 0.039*** 0.062*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
 
Employment over assets i, t -5.970*** -31.137*** -3.636*** -6.938*** -14.663*** -5.898*** 
 (1.393) (0.877) (1.363) (1.422) (2.795) (1.780) 
Total liabilities over total assets i, t-1 -0.042*** -0.051 0.013 -0.032*** -0.007 0.017 
 (0.010) (0.032) (0.012) (0.011) (0.030) (0.013) 
Cash flow over assets i, t-1    0.110*** 0.089 -0.008 
    (0.033) (0.087) (0.034) 
Cash flow squared over assets i,t-1    -0.140*** -0.062*** 0.016** 
    (0.025) (0.018) (0.007) 
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Sector-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes 
R-squared 0.201 0.581 0.341 0.198 0.386 0.315 
Observations number 9481 5996 7527 9229 5766 7316 
Number of firms 5829 4264 5407 5669 4138 5301 
Standard errors in parentheses.       
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 4: Estimation of Investment to Cash flow sensitivities depending on the share of 
Foreign Direct Investment for private Chinese firms  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lagged dependent var i, t-1 -0.365*** -0.365*** -0.270*** -0.367*** -0.366*** -0.365*** -0.365***
(investment divided by lagged total assets) (0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
change in turnover over assets i, t 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.063*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
cash flow over assets i, t-1 0.134*** 0.208*** 0.205*** 0.233*** 0.245*** 0.233*** 0.234***
(0.033) (0.054) (0.077) (0.045) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048)
employment over assets i, t -6.906*** -6.977*** -4.553* -7.609*** -7.584*** -7.301*** -7.302***
(1.423) (1.423) (2.449) (1.434) (1.434) (1.429) (1.429)
cash flow over assets squared i, t -0.149*** -0.129*** 0.178** -0.122*** -0.112*** -0.102*** -0.102***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.089) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030)
Province level share of fixed asset investment financed b0.252
source CSY i, t (0.175)
Interaction with cash flow i, t -1.492*
(0.876)
Province level FDI/gdp -0.001
source CSY i, t (0.002)
Interaction with cash flow i, t -0.013
(0.014)
Share of foreign enterprises in tangible assets -0.104**
source Oriana i, t (0.051)
Interaction with cash flow i, t -0.473***
(0.145)
Share of foreign enterprises in total assets -0.063
source Oriana i, t (0.058)
Interaction with cash flow i, t -0.521***
(0.155)
Share of foreign enterprises in turnover 0.003
source Oriana i, t (0.048)
Interaction with cash flow i, t -0.390***
(0.140)
Share of foreign enterprises in sales 0.003
source Oriana i, t (0.048)
Interaction with cash flow i, t -0.391***
(0.140)
sector (2 digits)-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 9229 9229 7203 9229 9229 9229 9229
Number of id 5669 5669 5513 5669 5669 5669 5669
R-squared 0.204 0.341 0.331 0.208 0.207 0.205 0.205
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
CSY: Chinese Statistical Yearbook 
Oriana: firm-level database from which we aggregated variables like province/sector tangible assets, total assets, 
turnover and sales. 
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Table 5: Estimation of Investment to Cash flow sensitivities depending on the share of State 
Owned firms per industry for private Chinese firms .  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lag dependent i, t-1 -0.365*** -0.366*** -0.365*** -0.364*** -0.364*** -0.364*** -0.364***
(investment divided by lagged total assets) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
change in turnover over assets i, t 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
cash flow over assets i, t-1 0.134*** 0.097** -0.095 0.096** 0.080* 0.086** 0.085**
(0.033) (0.044) (0.162) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)
employment over assets i, t -6.906*** -6.932*** -6.988*** -6.994*** -7.033*** -7.089*** -7.091***
(1.423) (1.423) (1.425) (1.424) (1.424) (1.425) (1.425)
cash flow over assets squared i, t -0.149*** -0.138*** -0.129*** -0.149*** -0.149*** -0.148*** -0.148***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Province level state share of employment -0.150
source CSY i, t (0.100)
Interaction with cash flow i, t 0.383
(0.266)
Province level share of investment financed by state budget 0.071
source CSY i, t (0.086)
Interaction with cash flow i, t 0.687
(0.574)
Share of foreign enterprises in tangible assets -0.041
source Oriana i, t (0.036)
Interaction with cash flow i, t 0.217
(0.140)
Share of foreign enterprises in total assets -0.036
source Oriana i, t (0.043)
Interaction with cash flow i, t 0.336**
(0.155)
Share of foreign enterprises in turnover 0.029
source Oriana i, t (0.044)
Interaction with cash flow i, t 0.346**
(0.173)
Share of foreign enterprises in sales 0.028
source Oriana i, t (0.044)
Interaction with cash flow i, t 0.350**
(0.173)
sector (2 digits)-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 9229 9229 9229 9229 9229 9229 9229
Number of id 5669 5669 5669 5669 5669 5669 5669
R-squared 0.204 0.341 0.205 0.204 0.205 0.205 0.205
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
CSY: Chinese Statistical Yearbook 
Oriana: firm-level database from which we aggregated variables like province/sector tangible assets, total 
assets, turnover and sales. 
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